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The New Psychology of War and Peace

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Book Review

Int'l
Security
(1986-7)

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by
Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (with contributions by Patrick M. Morgan and Jack L. Snyder). *Psychology and Deterrence*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.

7 Title

The Freudian Revolution is now more or less complete. Due to the efforts of Freud and his successors, few of us now have the slightest doubt that there are deeper layers to our minds than is at first apparent, and that occurring within the psychological underworld are processes causing distortion, denial, and other sorts of self-deception. We are not entirely what we seem to be; our actions, we believe, are not fully explicable without reference to the psychological means by which we seem often to defend ourselves against reality. Yet Freud would have been the first to admit that his revolutionary enterprise consisted mainly in transferring the old wine of the ancients into new, semi-scientific bottles, fit for modern consumption. Thus, it is altogether fitting to find the essential message of *Psychology and Deterrence* an attempt to apply the psychological viewpoint to self-deception in foreign policymaking, contained in the writings of Thucydides, the first great chronicler of international politics. In *The Peloponnesian War*, he has the powerful Athenians say to the weaker inhabitants of the island of Melos, a people the Athenians will soon destroy:

Hope, danger's comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colors only when they are ruined.¹

For deepening my understanding of the relations between psychology and foreign policy, thanks are due to Robert Dallek, Richard Ned Lebow, Frederic Mosher, Thomas C. Schelling, and especially to McGeorge Bundy, Janet M. Lang, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

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1. Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley and R. Feetham, in R.M. Hutchins, ed., *Great Books of the Western World* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), Vol. 6, pp. 347-616; quotation on p. 506.

The authors of *Psychology and Deterrence* attempt to provide both a suitable framework for, and historical examples of, foreign policymakers who let their hopes and fears run away with their rational judgment, many of whom were, like the Melians, ruined as a result.

The impetus for writing this book may be put in two propositions: first, the psychological principles, which were well known to Thucydides, rediscovered by Freud, appropriated by contemporary cognitive science, and accepted by most educated people everywhere, seem to have almost totally eluded the grasp of the architects of political and military deterrence. Theorists of deterrence are regarded by the authors of this volume as psychologically innocent in the extreme. Second, as Richard Ned Lebow says, "deterrence remains the principle [sic] intellectual and policy bulwark against nuclear holocaust" (p. 204). Thus, Lebow and his co-authors believe that attempts to deter nuclear war—to avoid the ultimate catastrophe—are very deeply misinformed psychologically, so much so, in fact, that present policies of deterrence may help to produce the nuclear war they are designed to help avoid. Their sworn enemy, therefore, is not deterrence, but deterrence *theory*, which they believe is based on a specious, pre-Freudian (and, by implication, pre-Thucydidean) rational-actor psychology that simply does not conform to the thinking and behavior of actual foreign policymakers. *Psychology and Deterrence* is at its core an argument that holds that the classical theory of deterrence ought to be regarded as psychologically refuted and that we must look in new, more psychologically informed directions for a safer approach to deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence.

Before confronting the arguments of the revolutionaries, however, let us remind ourselves briefly of two of the central tenets of the old regime, both of which are denied categorically by the authors of this volume. According to Thomas Schelling (whom the authors of this volume regard as by far the most important expositor of deterrence theory), deterrence "is not concerned with the efficient *application* of force but with the *exploitation of potential force*."² This is uncontroversial but important: deterrence is alleged to be mainly about preventing war. Second, according to Schelling, the theory of deterrence holds that human behavior is interdependent, the actions of adversaries being both cause and effect of one another's behavior. As Schelling says, "Deterrence . . . involves confronting . . . [an adversary] with evidence that

2. Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 5.

our behavior will be determined by his behavior."³ These and related propositions, which together have exerted enormous influence on the continuing debates about U.S. foreign policy, are put forward by Schelling in the manner of general laws, according to which it is considered legitimate and instructive to deduce completely hypothetical conflicts between disembodied, adversarial, international "actors," who signal their commitments credibly and audibly to one another and who are deterred from attacking only because the net gain calculated to be derived from not attacking is greater.

One of the defining characteristics of genius is the capacity to shape not merely the content of debate, but to determine the terms, parameters, or contours within which debate takes place. This is certainly true of Schelling, who in 1960 admitted, for example, that the psychological study of conflict is a legitimate enterprise but then promptly declared it out of bounds for serious students of international conflict. He decreed "a main dividing line . . . between those that treat conflict as a pathological state and seek its causes and treatment, and those that take conflict for granted and study the behavior associated with it."⁴ In other words, according to Schelling, there ought to be a great divide between clinical and academic psychology, on the one hand, and the strategy of international conflict—of deterrence—on the other. That this great divide has been respected, even revered by students of international relations, no one can doubt. But the authors of *Psychology and Deterrence* try, in effect, to ignore Schelling's canonical dichotomy altogether and to begin to carve out a third way: a psychologically informed approach to the prevention of international conflict, a hybridization that has heretofore seemed all but impossible due to the hegemony of Schelling's great divide. Psychology is to be brought out of its closet and into contact with cases of successful and failed deterrence, cases that the old paradigm is held to be incapable of explaining. By openly acknowledging and allowing for what they regard as the ubiquitous irrationality of foreign policy decision-making, the revolutionaries seek to construct a more rational and empirically robust theory of deterrence.

Robert Jervis leads off with two chapters containing a wide array of briefly described cases, which he interprets in the light of some selected findings from cognitive psychology. His subject is bias in the perception of threats, and he divides the psychological domain of interest into two types: unmo-

3. Ibid., p. 13.

4. Ibid., p. 18.

unmotivated

activated bias, which occurs as a function of predispositions, stimulus overload, and selective attention; and motivated bias, in which inference is used as a defense mechanism, that is, as protection against knowledge of risk and danger. As an example of unmotivated bias or a "short cut to rationality" (p. 23), Jervis cites inattention to "base rates" (an idea derived from psychologists Amos Tversky and Dan Kahneman).⁵ That is, policymakers often mistakenly estimate probabilities because they pay insufficient attention to the overall frequency of events, attending instead only to the vividness of some referent case. For instance, the overreliance on the "Munich Analogy" and the resulting overestimation of threat is a function, Jervis believes, of failing to come to grips with the extreme rarity of leaders who are as deceitful, powerful, and aggressive as Hitler (p. 24). As an example of motivated bias, Jervis cites the specious Japanese reasoning that led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor. They believed, rather incredibly according to Jervis, that after the bombing, the United States would simply withdraw from the Pacific (p. 26), a conclusion Jervis believes was motivated by a powerful need to avoid confronting the objectively more likely event, which was all-out war with the United States. The antidote to both sorts of bias and thus to erroneous threat perception and increased risk of the failure of deterrence is said to be the acquisition of a finer-grained understanding of one another's beliefs, perceptions, and values, a task that Jervis fully acknowledges is easier said than done (p. 33).

If the value of this book resides very largely in its argument for a psychologically more empirical approach to deterrence, then the two case study chapters by Janice Gross Stein (on the October War of 1973) and one by Richard Ned Lebow (on the Falklands War of 1982) must be regarded as, in important respects, the heart and soul of the volume. For it is in the thick texture of such extended case analyses that one must try to determine the nature, significance, and extent of psychological bias, and their relation to the failure or maintenance of deterrence. Stein's chapters are marvelous evocations of the attitudes in both the Egyptian and Israeli High Commands during the period 1967–1973. The dual narratives are so thoroughly compelling that one may actually feel as well as acknowledge intellectually the striking psychological paradox, which, Stein believes, provided the prereq-

✓5. Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

uisite to the October War of 1973. In assessing one's ability to carry out a successful attack upon the other, according to Stein, "Egypt could but thought it couldn't, while Israel thought Egypt could but wouldn't because Egypt thought it couldn't" (p. 48). Because of Stein's deft weaving together of her sources, one sees in this paradox not mere word play, but a formula for tragedy. In the end the Israelis paid too close attention to the military balance and were lulled by numerous false alarms caused by Egyptian mobilizations between 1967 and 1973. They failed, in Stein's view, to appreciate how deeply intolerable the post-1967 status quo was to Sadat and to Egypt. Most significantly, according to Stein, neither leadership can be said, as deterrence theory predicts, to have responded to deterrent threats, as they were understood by each deterrer. It was a dialogue of the deaf and the deafness, in her view, has a psychological explanation. *

Lebow's chapter on the Falklands War, while similar to Stein's in its ostensible intent, is much harsher in tone and much more thoroughly a piece of self-consciously psychological analysis. Lebow, so it seems, means to accuse as much as to analyze. There are no heroes in his account, nor scarcely any ordinarily fallible people; there are only buffoons. Both the Thatcher and Galtieri governments, according to Lebow, must be deemed guilty of massive self-deception. In an extended passage of psychohistory, he accuses the Americans of "paranoia" (p. 114), the Argentines of "lack of sophistication" (p. 116), and everyone concerned of "selective attention" (p. 119) and "perceptual distortion" (p. 119), the latter of which he believes was "the real cause of the war" (p. 119). In approaching the participants in this particular failure of deterrence so harshly and reductively, Lebow appears to push the psychologizing of deterrence somewhat further than the other authors. In Lebow's causal account, the issue perceived by the participants as that which led to the failure of deterrence—control of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands—seems to fade into the background, while psychological breakdown is put forth as central. The logic of Lebow's argument would seem to lead ultimately to the view that, at least in the case of the Falklands War (but probably in other failures of deterrence as well), the relation of the student of deterrence to the participants in case studies is much like that of psychiatrist to patient, at least in the diagnostic phase. Lebow, it seems, would push the Freudian revolution all the way so that the study of foreign policy decision-making becomes, eventually, something like a branch of depth psychology. If this were ever to occur, the revolt against fully rational deterrence theory would

have become total. Irrational actors would replace rational actors in the analyses of international relations specialists, who would by then have bid goodbye to deterrence and hello to psychology.

The conclusions to the volume, contained in two chapters by Lebow, are boldly psychological.⁶ First, Lebow argues that "denial, selective attention, and other psychological sleights of hand" (p. 173) are ubiquitous in situations when deterrence is on the line and that international aggression is far more a function of perceived need than of opportunity. Lebow thus provides an extended gloss on his well-known argument that states do not jump through windows of opportunity. As Lebow sees it, states (or presumably their leaders) are best understood as turning inward rather than outward toward their own unresolved wishes and fears. They leap, one might say, into murky basements of felt need, rather than through windows of perceived opportunity.⁷ And since the theory and practice of deterrence has heretofore emphasized the arrangements required for preventing windows of opportunity from arising, it is no wonder, according to Lebow, that history is littered with failures of deterrence caused by misperception and misunderstanding. In a thoroughly Freudian argument, Lebow argues, in effect, that such windows (hence rational deterrence itself) are illusions—manageable fantasies which are preferred to the frightening reality actually faced by policymakers, especially in the nuclear age.⁸ This is, in fact, exactly the form of Freud's argument against what he regarded as the illusion of religion.⁹

6. Deliberately omitted from critical consideration are the two chapters that immediately precede the concluding chapters in *Psychology and Deterrence*: Patrick M. Morgan, "Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence," and Jack L. Snyder, "Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914." This is done not because these essays are uninteresting or unimportant. In fact, they are neither. Morgan's discussion of the peculiarly American obsession with reputation or resolve is suggestive and compelling, and Snyder's typology of security dilemmas involves many interesting examples of this central concept of political science. The problem, rather, is that each is strikingly abstract and deductive in the extreme and thus almost totally at odds with the entire thrust of the rest of the book, which is self-consciously concrete and inductive. In short, considered apart from these anomalous chapters by Morgan and Snyder, the book advances a significant argument for a fundamental reorientation of thinking about U.S. foreign policy. But the chapters by Morgan and Snyder, for all their intrinsic interest, only qualify, obscure, and ultimately negate the central methodological argument of the book, which would thus have been far more coherent without them.

✓ 7. Richard Ned Lebow, "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 147–186.

✓ 8. Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

9. Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, in James Strachey, trans. and ed., *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1966), Vol. 21, pp. 3–56.

The policy conclusions to *Psychology and Deterrence* are a curious mixture of sensible policy suggestions and pessimistic handwringing about what Lebow and his colleagues obviously regard as the very dim prospects for enacting such policies. The recommendations follow directly from the psychological analyses: adopt a "mixed strategy," as Lebow calls it (p. 227), in which threat and reassurance are balanced, according to the best estimate of the needs, fears, and goals of an adversary. Stein agrees completely, calling in her own conclusion for a balanced mixture of "accommodation and coercion" (p. 86).¹⁰

Yet in concluding *Psychology and Deterrence*, Lebow quite obviously recognizes that he has arrived at a conceptual cul-de-sac. He demonstrates considerable intellectual courage in facing up to what is essentially a nihilistic conclusion. This is Lebow's paradox:

Deterrence, which, relatively speaking, is easy to implement, may nevertheless not be a very effective strategy of conflict management, because it does not address the most important [psychological] sources of aggression. On the other hand, efforts to alleviate the kinds of insecurities that actually encourage or even compel leaders to pursue aggressive foreign policies do not seem very likely to succeed. (p. 192)

This is one of the most remarkable passages in the book. For it repudiates the classical theory of deterrence because it is psychologically bankrupt, while it leads us to believe that a psychologically informed approach, while theoretically safer, is probably pragmatically bankrupt. The old view is wrong and thus dangerous; the new view is right but irrelevant.

In fact, neither Lebow nor his coauthors (nor, for that matter, this reviewer) can imagine a means for plausibly intervening *directly* into the psychological lives of policymakers so as to reduce the intensity of the needs which seem to motivate many failures of deterrence. The psychological laboratory and clinic are presently and very likely will remain terra incognita for foreign policymakers. At the very end of the book, in partial flight from the nihilistic terminus of his logic, Lebow suggests that perhaps we can learn important

✓ 10. See Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War* (New York: Norton, 1985), p. 215. Indeed, such arguments would seem to be fully consistent with and to provide the psychological foundation for the canonical endorsement of "balanced deterrence" in *Hawks, Doves, and Owls*. The authors of that book recommend the simultaneous avoidance of hawkish provocation, ineffectual dovish appeasement, and owl paralysis. They conclude with a lengthy list of concrete recommendations designed to achieve balanced deterrence and thus to prevent dangerous crises between the superpowers. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Nuclear Ethics* (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 119.

psychological lessons from some astonishing and peaceful reversals in international relations, especially that of Sadat in 1975. But this is exceedingly cold comfort for the psychological revolutionaries for, as Stein points out, the key prerequisite to that initiative was a bloodbath of proportions that were unacceptably abhorrent to both sides. Likewise with the superpowers, the countries whose sour relationship hovers like a cloud over this entire book. The Kennedy-Khrushchev peace initiative of 1963 is almost unthinkable without the terrifying Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. And so it goes: a book whose authors set out to conduct a psychological revolution ends by engaging in courageous but unequivocal conceptual self-destruction.

What has gone wrong? Why have these psychological analyses led to such pessimism? Let us first be clear about what is *not* wrong: the psychological analyses of deterrence in this volume are not uninteresting or implausible. In this thoroughly Freudian era, very few people try to resist psychological explanations per se, and many of them put forth in this volume are very compelling. On the level of what is sometimes called "political psychology," therefore, the book must be regarded as a brilliant success. There *is*, one is inclined to conclude with the authors, a huge psychological deficiency in the theory of rational deterrence. We see clearly that the theory does not put nearly enough emphasis on nonrational determinants of human thinking and behavior.

The problem, rather, is one that is endemic to the entire field of political psychology. As Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out, while "politics is wholly psychological," proposed solutions to (what may be regarded as importantly psychological) problems of war and peace must be wholly political.¹¹ And this means critically that proposed solutions must be situated firmly within the cognitive context of the policymakers, who must come to believe that the proposals will help to solve what *they* regard as real problems of war and peace, of deterrence and reassurance, not "perceptual distortion" or "paranoia" or other psychological problems. Lebow is correct to conclude that foreign policymakers are quite unlikely to respond favorably, if they respond at all, to overtly psychological proposals.¹² They are in fact likely to regard

✓ 11. Stanley Hoffmann, "On the Political Psychology of War and Peace: A Critique and an Agenda," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 1-21; quotation on p. 1.

✓ 12. See J.P. Kahan, R.E. Darilek, M.H. Graubard, and N.C. Brown, with assistance from A. Platt and B.R. Williams, *Preventing Nuclear Conflict: What Can the Behavioral Sciences Contribute?* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1983); and Carnegie Corporation, "Behavioral Sciences and the Prevention of Nuclear War" (Mimeo, 1984).

such proposals as, in the felicitous phrasing of William James, so much "mythological and poetic talk about psychology" and of no interest or relevance to them.¹³ To believe otherwise would be mere wishful thinking of just the sort that the authors of this volume find so ubiquitous and discomfiting in foreign policymakers.

X What can be done about Lebow's paradox? Is there a psychologically informed approach to deterrence that is policy-relevant? There is indeed, although it is unlikely to satisfy either psychologists or political scientists seeking to borrow disciplinary *knowledge* from one another and apply it directly to pragmatic problems of war and peace. As Lebow argues, this does not work. The findings of cognitive and clinical psychology, in all their multitudinous disciplinary forms, are unlikely to be helpful to policymakers. What would be helpful is a psychological approach that takes fully into account the substantial nonrational component of deterrence but that is transparent, inconspicuous, and devoid of "off-the-shelf" solutions from psychology. Among psychologists, this approach is called "phenomenology," the study of the stream of thought as it appears to the thinking and perceiving subject. Its chief architect was William James.¹⁴ The goal of such an approach would be this (in the phrasing of Paul Bracken): "Instead of trying to change people . . . [we should try] to change the premises of their decisions through . . . removal of the threats that compel them to make irrevocable choices. . . ."¹⁵ One must be psychologically concerned, but one must also provide genuine policy choices. This seems to be the most promising way to avoid the psychological innocence of rational deterrence theory while also avoiding the policy irrelevance of disciplinary psychology.

Toward the end of the Melian dialogue, Thucydides has the Athenians accuse the Melians of wishful thinking, of retreating to illusion and thus to regarding "what is out of sight [as] more certain than what is before your eyes."¹⁶ The authors of *Psychology and Deterrence* make an analogous and

13. William James, Letter to Francis J. Child, August 16, 1878, cited in Gay Wilson Allen, *William James* (New York: Viking, 1967), p. 211.

14. Extended arguments for a phenomenological psychology of war and peace and its debt to William James are in James G. Blight, "How Might Psychology Contribute To Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War?," *Political Psychology*, in press; and "Psychology and Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War: From Parallel Paths to Fruitful Interaction," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, in press.

15. Paul Bracken, "Accidental Nuclear War," in Allison et al., *Hawks, Doves, and Owls*, pp. 25–53; quotation on p. 52.

16. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, p. 507.

convincing point about rational deterrence theorists and practitioners. But to complete the revolution in thinking about deterrence, which requires not merely the demolition of the old anti-psychology but also construction of a new policy-relevant psychology, we must also apply the Athenian accusation to Jervis, Lebow, and Stein and urge them, along with all who study deterrence, to begin the psychological analysis where the policymaker begins and thus to ask first and throughout not what is "out of sight," supposedly buried in the deeply layered cognitive processes of policymakers, but rather what is "before their eyes," seeming to those who must make the decisions to pose threats to deterrence and thus to peace.

What would some such psychological approach be like that avoids counterproductive dependence on obscure psychological assumptions and literatures and that also (like *Psychology and Deterrence*) is focused centrally on avoiding nuclear war between the superpowers? Obviously, it is impossible in a relatively brief review to be explicit about all or many of the dimensions and emphases of a research program that meets these requirements. But to get the proper orientation and to begin to ask the relevant questions, one can do no better than to follow up the psychological implications of the main thesis of a previous book by Jervis:

✱ it is not an exaggeration to speak of the nuclear revolution. Unless a state has first-strike capability, it is hard to see how having [what Paul Nitze calls] "the advantage at the uppermost level of violence" helps. Indeed, it is even hard to tell what that means . . . [because] the side that is ahead is no more protected than the side that is behind.¹⁷

If Jervis is correct, then the "nuclear revolution" ought to have crystal clear psychological reality to leaders of the superpowers in those moments when they believe they face the actual, imminent (though still contingent) probability of nuclear war.

This is exactly what we find in, for example, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962: the psychological transformation of the nuclear revolution, described by Jervis, from mere intellectual awareness of its logical possibility to intense, preoccupying fear of its operational consequences. Richard Neustadt has summarized this psychological shift in an apt aphorism: it is the awareness of "the risk of irreversibility become irreparable."¹⁸ In moments of surpassing

✓ 17. Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 58.

18. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership From FDR to Carter* (New York: Wiley, 1980), p. 158. (Italics in original.)

nuclear danger, the technological revolution noted by Jervis seems to produce a psychological revolution, namely, that nuclear weapons are regarded suddenly and unequivocally by political leaders as useless in the pursuit of political and military goals. During the crises in Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962)—the only two war-threatening crises between the superpowers in the age of potential, mutual annihilation—President Kennedy and his closest advisers could not indeed derive any concrete meaning from the calculation of their (very large) relative advantage in deliverable nuclear weapons.¹⁹

Moreover, these instances of psychological nuclear revolution had consequences so important and so well known that it is remarkable that they play no role whatever in *Psychology and Deterrence*. Chief among these is the singular absence from high-level decision-making of just the sorts of psychological biases, projections, paranoia, and so forth in which the decision-making during the Falklands and Middle East wars seems to the authors literally to be saturated.²⁰ Awareness of grave nuclear danger seems to have elicited not only great fear but also great caution and enhanced psychological maturity. The evolution of presidential decision-making during the missile crisis, for example, is in large part the story of a group of nuclear pilgrims' progress toward an understanding of the predicament Khrushchev was in. Nothing resembling this sort of psychological evolution can be discovered in the case studies in *Psychology and Deterrence*. In fact, psychological devolution in crises is the veritable subject of the inquiry.

The psychological incommensurability between the nonnuclear and nuclear cases poses grave doubts about the central, if somewhat implicit, goal of the book: to produce a more empirical approach to the study of nuclear deterrence by means of a psychological analysis of nonnuclear cases, of which we may have many and, at that, many that ran their course all the way to war. But the psychologies of these two sorts of events—nuclear and non-nuclear—seem almost to be the inverse of one another as, indeed, do the results. In each case examined in this book, war broke out, while we have yet to experience a war between the superpowers.

19. See George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Roswell Gilpatric, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Theodore Sorensen, "The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Time*, September 27, 1982, pp. 85–86. See also Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 137–163.

20. Irving L. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 123–158. See also Alexander L. George, "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962," in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 86–143.

Thus, in addition to questions of policy, any psychological inquiry into nuclear deterrence must also address these issues: first, what, if any, relevance have nonnuclear cases to nuclear cases in the era of mutual, potential annihilation? It appears that, even when viewed within the somewhat reductive psychological categories favored by the authors of *Psychology and Deterrence*, the connections do not exist. Second, what should be the focus of a psychological approach to nuclear crisis decision-making? A central feature, it appears, ought to be the ways in which situational variables interact with what Jervis calls the "nuclear revolution" to produce heightened awareness of its implications in crises. Consistent with this orientation would be the avoidance of what is, in effect, a psychology of misperceptions, miscalculations, and other presumed psychologically based mistakes of leaders. It ought to be replaced with a psychology of the evolving fear of such mistakes, which is an entirely different sort of inquiry, one requiring far less borrowing from psychological literatures and nonnuclear cases and far more attention to the nature, structure, and pace of the psychological evolution of leaders in nuclear crises. This means, finally, that we must return to the study of Berlin in 1961 and most of all to Cuba in 1962 to decipher why, unlike the outcomes of the cases discussed in *Psychology and Deterrence*, the United States and the Soviet Union did not go to war during those deep crises. In short, in order to meet the valid demand for a more empirical, less deductive approach to nuclear deterrence, a new sort of immersion in "psychology" is required—not immersion in psychological literatures, but rather imaginative immersion into the way nuclear danger looks and feels to those who must try to manage it.